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FORUM JURIDICUM
MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS
AND. THE JUDGE FUNCTION*

IN RE

THE

LAW

Robert C. Finley**
It is now more years ago than I like to admit since I was a
student at the Duke Law School. At that time, I thought of the
law and the judge function solely in an aura of positivistic dimensions. In fact, it seemed as if one could almost reach out,
touch, and ascertain the material existence of a permanent, schematic arrangement of great legal principles and impressive
precedential cases. At the time, it further appeared to me
clearly that this closed system of certainties and absolutes operated quite automatically in the hands of lawyers and judges and
that with little help from them the system generated its own
implementation, providing answers and solutions to multitudinous questions and problems involving people and things, cabbages and kings, shoes, ships and sealing wax.
It seemed to me the law was just there. And it was enough
that it existed. Further understanding through laboratory or
scalpel-like dissection and analysis might be helpful, but it was
not absolutely necessary.
I was not tempted or inclined to make any distinctions
between abstract intellectual concepts and life's realities. Any reference to the "is" and the "ought to be," or to any so-called mindmatter dichotomy in the sense of philosophical values, jurisprudential thinking, and evaluations, disenchanted me and actually
was beyond my "ken."
As a first-year law student, the process of becoming a lawyer did seem a long, difficult, and complex one, but relatively
simple in terms of method. In the days and years ahead, my
task was to become well acquainted with the law- and this
largely through the then pedagogically touted Langdell case
method. In other words, I must master the great principles and
.Address by Judge Robert C. Finley, Washington State Supreme Court, at the
Law School, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on November

25, 1963.
**Judge, The Supreme Court, State of Washington.
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rules of the law epitomized in the precedents of decided cases!
Once having accomplished this fairly well, I would in fact have
acquired standing and competence as a lawyer. With this statusi
legal solutions of legal problems in miscellaneous lawsuits would
be within comparatively easy reach.
I suppose the judging function, if I had thought of it analYt..
ically, would have appeared simply as a process of finding or
discovering the law. Application of the law then followed naturally and automatically in solving innumerable legal problems,some of them undoubtedly presenting some novel and different
human, or other, considerations and orientations. In any event,
with proper industry and appropriate intellectual effort, a likely, proper, and perhaps even kindly, revelation would occur in'
due course.
Such a state of mind is unquestionably a rather pleasant one,
characterized by feelings of certainty, security, and an inner
sense of well being. But this state of euphoria was not mine for
very long. I encountered some curiously skeptical, probing.
'characters" with questioning minds among the Duke Univer-,
sity Law Faculty. There was talk, actually, about the meaning
of language - and, strangely enough, about the meaning of
meaning. There was talk of the function of word symbols in
identifying and communicating ideas, and in implementing intellectual concepts or legal conceptualizations. I was surprised
to find that, according. to Mr. Justice Holmes, words were nothing more than the skin of ideas.
Gradually, my youthful zeal in the quest of great learning in
the law became freighted with uncertainties, complications, and
difficulties. For example, in the first year class in torts, the
legal principle or concept of negligence, with underlying, allegedly moral concepts respecting fault or blameworthiness, became something less than exact in application, particularly when
confronted with the apparently countervailing legal principle or
concept of contributory negligence, also an allegedly morallybased or inspired doctrine. Curiously enough, contributory negligence frequently lost luster and potency for resolving a legal
controversy in a confrontation with the "last clear chance doctrine." In the evolving field of negligence law, I became acquainted (it seemed almost on a first-name basis) with Mr.
Justice Cardozo in the Palsgraff case,' but it was indeed a strug1. Palsgraff v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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igle to cope with his and Justice Andrews' disagreement respecting the principle of proximate cause and its applicability in
Palsgraff. As a principle, it almost eluded me in seeming either
to amalgamate or neutralize antithetical considerations or
values. But in the hands of jurors, properly instructed in specific cases, it provided a handy resolution of a lawsuit. Absent
proximate causation, the defendant won; with it, the plaintiff
carried the day. Shorn of a neophyte's frustrations, legal proliferation, and adornment or obfuscations, it was as simple as
that. However, it did become apparent, even to me at that time,
that the principle of proximate cause required facts to operate
2
it. And facts, whatever they were - and that's another story
seemed to be weighed and weighted differently, if not by "a
reasonable man," then sometimes by jurors or trial judges, and
frequently by appellate judges. The latter, somehow, seemed to
have the last say most of the time anyhow.
At this point in my -legal indoctrination, revelation and evolution, certainties and absolutes, intellectual security and serenity, were beginning to give way to a not inconsiderable degree
of confusion and frustration in my thinking, and in my efforts
to understand the law and the judge function.
In the class in Anglo-American legal history the. conflict between Lord Coke and the Chancellors Ellesmere and Bacon was
to me at first an interesting bit of historical news. Shortly,
however, this posed the monumental intellectual or philosophical,
and possibly a bureaucratic, conflict between the English common law courts and the courts of chancery or equity.

Appar-

ently also involved was a struggle respecting royal prerogaitive and revenues; but the latter would be another story when
time permits. Among other epithets, the erstwhile defenders of
Lord Coke and the English common law courts asserted caustically that cases in equity were usually gauged and determined by
the length of the Chancellor's foot. In essence, it was again the
conflict between certainty, absolutes, and consistency (often for
2. Becker, What are Historical Facts? 8 W. POL. Q. 327, 336-37 (1935) ;
Cahn, Jerome Frank's Fact Skepticism and Our Future, 66 YALE L.J. 824
(1957) ; Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 3 NATURAL L.F. 68 (1958) ;
Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1922) ; Morris, Law and
Pact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1942) ; Nagel, On the Fusion of Fact and Value:
,4 Reply to Professor Fuller, 3 NATURAL L.F. 77 (1958).
3.

GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS

ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITU-

TIONs 240 (1930); KINNANE, A FIRST BOOK ON ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW ch. XI

(2d ed. 1952) (See particularly §§ 111-12) ; Adams, The Origin of English
Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87 (1916).
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consistency's sake) on the one hand, and flexibility, change and
discretion, on the other hand, in judicial evaluation, decision,
and disposition of lawsuits. My tribulation was compounded by
the observations of Mr. Justice Holmes that the era of the black
letter men of the law (literal-minded readers of the printed
word) was on the wane ;4 that statistics, scientific and sociological data would progressively, but inevitably, influence the
course of the law; that logical methodology was of limited utility in the law as in other fields; that any proposition could be
given a logical form, and that actually a page of experience was
worth a book of logic. Now, as I look back, the coup de grace
to my student hopes and stumbling intellectual efforts to evolve
a tidy legal system of certainties and absolutes was administered
principally by assertions of Mr. Justice Holmes, such as the
following:
"The training of lawyers is a training in logic. The processes of analogy, discrimination, and deduction are those in
which they are most at home. The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method
and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose
which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is
illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the
logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, . .. and yet the very root
and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form." 5
There was no letup by the teachers at Duke Law School in
their often seemingly overzealous and always critical analytical
scalpel-like dissection of the law. In constitutional law the classroom evaluation of the decision written in Marbury v. Madison
by Chief Justice Marshall raised disturbing doubts about the
validity of the reasoning of the Chief Justice in establishing a
suspiciously pristine doctrine of judicial review.6
In the United States Supreme Court decision in Muller v.
Oregon,7 state police power legislation regulating the hours of
4. His exact words were: "For the rational study of the law the black-letter
man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of
statistics and the master of economics." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Hwv.
L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
5. Id. at 465.
6. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT DY JUDICIARY (1932).
7. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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work for women and minors was validated against constitutional attack. Clearly the emphasis upon the Brandeis brief
(which presented statistics, sociological and medical data)
raised considerable doubts as to the certainty and the automatic
operation of particular provisions of the United States Constitution.
In yet another field of law, critical classroom examination
and evaluation of the rules of statutory interpretation left considerable doubt as to their certainty and automatic operation in
the solution of lawsuits involving statutory problems. And this
became particularly apparent with the knowledge that a particular rule of statutory interpretation usually had its counterpart
or countervailing rule - and that opposite results were attainable depending upon judicious choice or selection of 8the rule or
statutory maxim of interpretation to be emphasized.
As a concept or rule of statutory interpretation, the phrase,
,the intent of the legislature,had resounding oracular persuasive:ness. But, under the analytical focus of Karl Llewellyn, Max
Radin, and other legal realists of the 1930's, the concept acquired some of the characteristics or earmarks of legal fictions.9
The realist inquisitors probed deeply into the question whether
it was rational to say that any given number of legislators had
any specific intent about a particular choice of words employed
by some legal draftsman in preparing a bill for legislative action.
They questioned further how many members of a legislative
committee, charged with primary responsibility for a bill, had
the time to spare from other legislative duties, had studied the
particular bill carefully, and could say what they intended as
to specific language used.
Actually, my sojourn in law school was in the era of the
writers of the American realist or sociological school of jurisprudence: Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, Morris Cohen, Max
Radin; and, with somewhat less agitation and fanfare and with
more equanimity, Roscoe Pound, John Henry Wigmore, Lon
Fuller, and others, were probing, questioning, putting off bal8. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950);
Loyd,'Equity of a Statute, 58 U. PA. L. REV. 76 (1909) ; Radin, Early Statutory
-Interpretationin England, 38 ILL. L. REV. 16 (1943) ; Thorne, Equity of a
Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 ILL. L. REV. 202 (1936).

9. Radin, Realism in Statutory Interpretation and Elsewhere, 23 CALIF. L.
REV. 157 (1934).
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ance, even toppling some orthodox and accepted views respecting the law and the judging function. As I see it now, there was
a transition in my attitude of mind - or perhaps peace of mind
from feelings of certainty and absolutes in relation to the law
toward an opposite extreme of almost complete flexibility and
creativity. It was an exercise in frustration, and an upsetting
experience. But, as I became better acquainted with Pound, and
particularly with Holmes and Cardozo, a change occurred. Their
observations and evaluations on the law and the nature of the
judicial process provided a different kind of understanding, and,
I think, a new dimension and appreciation of the law and the
judging function evolved in my consciousness. I found real utility and some quiet solace and satisfaction in Holmes and Cardozo, particularly in that wonderful passage in The Nature of
the JudicialProcess,10 where Cardozo says:
"My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this,
and to little more: logic, and history, and custom, and utility,
and the accepted standards of right conduct, are the forces
which singly or in combination shape the progress of the
law. Which of these forces shall dominate in any case, must
depend largely upon the comparative importance or value of
the social interests that will be thereby promoted or impaired."
My personal equation, i.e., what happened to my thinking
and state of mind as a young devotee of the law, seems epito':mized reasonably well in the little jingle on the flyleaf of Llewellyn's The Bramble Bush." It reads:
"There was a man in our town and he was wondrous wise:
"He jumped into a BRAMBLE BUSH and scratched out
both his eyes"and when he saw that he was blind,
"with all his might and main
"he jumped into another one
"and scratched them in again."
The conceptualizations of Holmes, Cardozo, and Pound concerning the law and the judging function have been very helpful to me in thirteen years of work as a member of the multijudge court of my state. Comparable conceptualizations by
10. CARDOZO, THE NATURE

OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

11. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE

BUSH (1951).

112 (1928).
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other analytical legal writers and their contributions to the modern Anglo-American literature on legal philosophy and jurisprudence provide a working basis for a forthright realistic
analysis of the law and the judicial process. But there is need
to evaluate the contributions of these outstanding people and
to proceed further with a careful study of the judicial process
broken down insofar as possible into its more minuscular facets
and parts. Someone has aptly pointed out that the law and the
judge function are multi-dimensioned realities. The goal should
be to define or to understand law, not in the abstract or in terms
of broad generalizations, but by close-up, careful analysis of the
practical workings of the process in actually litigated, decided
cases. Such an approach or project might well be lacking in
utility or merit, or even might be categorized as supererogation,
and accordingly dismissed. I might make such a concession regarding religion, love, and politics. But I am not content, nor
am I yet ready, to concede that the law and the judge function
are realities that naturally or inevitably resist analysis, and that
this is as it should be. So again I say that there has been too
much generalization and not enough particularization as to the
nature of the law and the judging function. In this vein Cardozo noted that law in its higher reaches is creative. 1 2 Arthur
L. Corbin, of the Yale Law Faculty, commenting on Cardozo, 13
recently observed:
"It is my conviction that the judicial process is 'creative'
throughout, and not merely in what Cardozo described as its
'highest reaches.'
The words of Learned Hand are worth quoting
and worth pondering. He has listed thus the judicial qualities that lead toward truth and justice: 'skepticism, tolerance, discrimination, urbanity, some - but not too much reserve toward change, and, above all, humility before the
vast unknown.' His words apply equally to a teacher and a
writer of the law."
In a further personal observation, Corbin said:
"Now, as an old man, there is neither pain nor disappointment in the realization that I have not reached the
S12.: 'CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166 (1928).

18.; Corbin,: A Creative Process, 6 YALE L. REP. 2 (1959).
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paradise of a Justice that is absolute, universal and eternal.
I rejoice in the conviction that Justice is a function of humanity, that decisions need not be arbitrary, that even if we
cannot reach the perfect and the best, we can at least strive
for the better and do the best we can ..
But again, these are generalizations. And the trouble with
such statements is that they attempt too much. And again, the
law and the judge function are all-encompassing, varied, and
complex in implication. Efforts to effect a simple, short definition, though well meaning, are in reality an imprecise exercise
in dilettante semantics, rather fantastic in conception, and impossible of realization. A more useful method of analysis respecting the law and the judge function (reasonably and practicably possible, and a manageable one in terms of language and
intellectual concepts) must be much less than all inclusive; in
fact, almost on a case-by-case analysis and synthesis.
To elaborate briefly and in one particular respect: When
Pound says the law (and by inference the judicial process) must
be stable yet it cannot stand still, he has stated a large, generalized truth or principle, yet one that is utterly inconsistent and
paradoxical in its two facets. We know that in some instances,
and in certain areas, the law is stable, and the judicial function
is nothing more than a reference to so-called absolutes, or at
least tentative ones, in terms of decision making in the particular instances and areas concerned. For example, consider certain areas of the law of negotiable instruments and certain
areas of real property law in our Anglo-American legal system.
As to these areas the judging function or operation tends to be
be rulistic - the law, its implementation through the courts,
tends strongly in the direction of absolutes and certainties. This
of course is itself a generalization, and I fall prey to my criticism of the glittering generalizations of others who have attempted definition, description, and explanation of the law and
the judge function. However, my generalization or observation
respecting the law of negotiable instruments and real property
indicates one end or one extreme of a possibly useful hypothetical measuring device or spectrum respecting the scope of the
law and the judge function.
In other instances and areas the law and the judge function
are flexible. Here, reference in terms of the judicial function iA
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to, values and considerations which, to say the least, are somewhat less than absolute, and just might be somewhat nonlegal
in nature. In this area the decisional function tends toward the
other pole or extreme of the spectrum and is in nature creative
and, perhaps, as Cardozo said, may provide only tentative solutions for insoluble problems. Having in mind the concept of.
absolutes at one end of the spectrum and the concept of flexibility and creativity at the other end, perhaps it would be interesting and worth the effort to attempt a finer focused analysis of
several specific appellate decisions. The effort, hopefully at
least, may serve to identify, pinpoint, or describe some aspects
of appellate reasoning, techniques, or methods employed and
the particular factors emphasized in the decision of specific
cases. We might note, if possible, whether the particular decision is oriented toward the absolute or toward the creative
extreme of the hypothetical juristic spectrum.
However, before considering specific cases, the problems inVolved, their evaluation, and final resolution by court decision,
it might be well to take a look at a few aspects of the judicial
process sometimes taken for granted or overlooked almost entirely. First of all, appellate courts are multi-judge tribunals as
distinguished - and it is an important distinction - from single-judge tribunals. The basic reason for this should be obvious.
Several heads are (or should be) better than one. This is true
in terms of a potentially larger, broader group knowledge in relation either to an assumption that the law is absolute or an
assumption that the law is creative. Group evaluation, group
reasoning, and group responsibility seem convincingly preferable to that of one individual. Curiously, the very fact of the
existence of multi-judge courts suggests, I think, the Cardozo
formula. This, of course, suggests an on-going process of reasoning and evaluation, the weighing of facts, and the weighting
of factors, individually and in combination, in the decision-making process, by different minds, different backgrounds of experience and training.
At this point another special facet of the judging function
deserves mention and emphasis. Annually, hundreds of cases are
presented to appellate courts in this country. These cases have
been analyzed and evaluated with considerable care by reasonably competent attorneys who are representing each side of the
controversy involved. I believe a very high percentage of ap-
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pellate advocates are reasonably competent, ethical practitioners.
If certainty, positivism, and absolutes are the all-pervading
qualities, characteristics or dynamics of the law, it seems incredible that competent, honest, and professionally ethical lawyers throughout the country, day in and day out, arrive at diametrically opposing evaluations in so many appellate cases, and
that they can contend that right and justice require disposition
in favor of their particular side. The only rational, satisfactory
explanation which occurs to me is that in most cases appealed
there is room for doubt, and that the law is not certain and absolute. Contrariwise, I shall add a caveat which may indicate
a reverse swing as to appropriate description or characterization of the law and the judging function - in the direction of
absolutes and certainties. A recent study of 1,000 appeals to
the Washington State Supreme Court shows that we affirmed
63.8%; in 36.2%, we reversed or modified substantially. (Query:
Is the law 63.8% absolute? is it 36.2% creative?)
But now let us get down to viewing and attempting to analyze some specific cases. As guinea pigs for the experiment, I
have selected several decisions of the Washington State Supreme
Court in which I participated.
In Kehus v. Eutenier,1 4 decided by the Washington State
Supreme Court in 1961, an Oregon court had granted a divorce
to the husband, but awarded custody of two minor daughters
under the age of three to the mother. Shortly, pursuant to a
stipulation by the divorced parents, the older child (then age
three) was transferred to the custody of the father. Six years
later, the mother sought to regain custody of the older girl (then
nine years of age). The request was denied by a Washington
trial court, and affirmed on appeal by the Washington State
Supreme Court.
Now some comment is appropriate respecting certain facets
of the evidentiary pattern and other dynamics of this case. The
trial court found that the mother had remarried twice after her
divorce in 1953. The third marriage was a relatively stable one.
The mother was gainfully employed as a school teacher and provided reasonably good care for the younger daughter in her custody. The husband was a good worker and a stable person, and.
had agreed to assume custody of both of the girls.
14. 59 Wash.2d 188, 367 P.2d 27 (1961).
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The nine-year-old girl and her father (who had been awarded legal custody) lived in very cramped quarters - a small, oneroom apartment. There was nothing against the father morally,
and he was a reasonably good worker. But he was unemployed
much of the time because his occupation was seasonal in nature.
His earnings were limited to approximately $2,200 a year.
When employed, he worked either day or night shifts, and frequently the child was left in the care of older women acting as
baby sitters. The mother, seeking to regain custody of the nineyear-old daughter, was earning approximately $6,000 a year as
a teacher, and her husband was earning approximately $4,000
a year. When questioned by the trial judge in his chambers, the
nine-year-old girl stated that she wanted to stay with her father.
Apparently she and the father had a good parent and child relationship and were genuinely fond of each other. There had
been little contact between the opposing parties themselves, or
between the children, each parent having custody of only one
daughter during most of the six years intervening since the divorce. The nine-year-old girl was very intelligent and presented
no disciplinary problems. In the decision on appeal, the majority of our court forthrightly conceded that they might have
reached a different conclusion if they had heard the case in the
first instance in the trial court, but they accepted the judgment
and decision of the trial judge, and refused to change the custody of the child. The underlying and decisive factors in the
trial court and on appeal seemed to be (a) that the child's more
obvious physical needs had been reasonably well cared for, (b)
that she had been living with the father for more than six years
at the time of the hearing, and (c) that he was a good man and
had done the best he could as a father, and for the child.
But a dissent was written, stating that the principle or rule
of law placing strong reliance upon the discretion and wisdom
of the trial court in custody matters does not mean or require
absolute reliance. The dissent emphasized the fact that the female child was approaching puberty and adolescence, that living with the father in a cramped one-room apartment was not
especially conducive to her then changing and expanding social
needs, and furthermore, that lack of adult female companionship and counsel was an important factor. The dissent pointed
out that the father was only seasonably employed, and that when
he was employed it was necessary for him to leave the child
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with someone else; that the school principal testified the nineyear-old girl seemed to have a particular affinity and an above
average need for the affection of women teachers. The dissent
further emphasized the contrast in available family income as
an important factor relating to the development, care, and custody of the child; that the younger sister was in the custody of
the mother, and that reunion and a closer association of the sisters had significant value; that the mother and her then husband were willing and able to provide a good home for both
girls, at a considerably better standard of living than the one
girl had with her father.
Now I will confess some personal concern about an off the
record, extra-legal fact or consideration. The trial judge who
heard this matter was one of our most experienced, and unquestionably had been one of the most competent and distinguished,
members of the trial bench. But at the time this child custody
matter was before him. he had apparently aged considerably
and was not well. This was generally known among the local
bar, had come to my attention, and perhaps was known to other
members of the appellate court. As a matter of fact, the trial
judge suffered a stroke and passed away before the disposition
of this case on appeal. It was my strong feeling that the indicated extra-legal circumstances were not only pertinent to appellate disposition, but rendered the trial judge's evaluation and
disposition of the custody matter somewhat dubious. Furthermore, it was my feeling that the legal rule or presumption usually followed in custody matters that the trial judge had properly
exercised judicial discretion was inappropriate and should not
be applied to sustain his denial of a change in custody. The basis
for this rule or presumption and its application by the appellate
court is a practical and, normally, a reasonably valid one: namely, the trial judge has the only opportunity to view and hear the
parties and their witnesses, and consequently he is in a better
position than the appellate court to pass on the vital matter of
credibility. However, objective evaluation by the trial judge is
a sine qua non.
The record was replete with conflicting testimony supporting the claims of each parent; but, unfortunately, the record before the appellate court was sadly lacking in information and
data pertinent to the actual welfare of the child, in terms of the
relative stability and emotional aura of the two households. I
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will say'further that during the conference with my associates
on the Supreme Court I became somewhat concerned, perhaps a
bit emotionally, about the determination of custody in this appeal. In effect, I may have tended to assume the role of an advocate in support of my personal evaluation of the matter. In oral
argument at the hearing on the case and as emphasized in the
subsequent dissent in the case, it was apparent that more than
two years had elapsed from the date of the decision by the trial
judge. Therefore, it seemed to me that as a very practical matter the case should be remanded and reheard by a different trial
judge, if for no other reason than that of the possibility that
conditions and circumstances might well have changed, and that
at least an up-to-date custody determination based on current
and expanded social data should be made by a different trial
judge.
Now again, I raise these questions: What objective or subjective criteria or standards were applied in this case? What
influenced and determined the decision? The pertinent principle
of law is that custody determinations must be made by the courts
to serve the best interests of the child. Obviously, this rule of
law, as such, discounts the conflicting claims, desires, and interests of the parents, making these subservient to the interests
of the child. In this respect the limiting or exclusionary effect
of the rule seems quite positivistic. In the majority and the dissenting opinions, each recognized, re-enunciated, and ostensibly
applied the same principle or rule of law relating to the best
interests of the child. But the end results and the custody
awards, as favored by the majority and by the dissent, were
diametrically conflicting. Why? What accounted for this? It
was not the facts, as such, for all of these were available, known
to, and considered by the majority and also the dissenting
judges. The answer lies in evaluation, interpretation, and
emphasis accorded to the various facts. But, did the facts supply their own evaluation, interpretation and emphasis, or the
standards for ascertaining such? If not, then the missing and
decisive component could have been supplied by the experience
and backgrounds, the personalities and reaction, the mental
processes of the appellate judges. But these facets of the problem are variables and are predictable, if at all, only in relation
to the individual judge, his memory recall respecting past experiences, the creative bent of his mind, his emotional, in fact,
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his total mental or intellectual orientation, reactions, and
processes.
Query again: Toward which end of the spectrum did the law
operate in this instance, and what about the judging function?
Should description and characterization be in terms of absolutes
and certainties, or in terms of flexibility or creativity? Were
the determinations as made by the judges closely related operationally to Cardozo's generalized formula? Could the applicable
rule of law possibly operate and decide the case without facts
or empirical data? Could this happen in a mechanical sense with
fact-data available but without interpretations or personal judicial value judgments as to these data?
A recent case 15 decided by our Washington Court involved
the meaning and effect of the language of a state statute which
provided for the creation and operation of water districts. In
our state these are legal entities or municipal corporations authorized to supply water to home owners or others. Two water
districts were created by inhabitants of particular geographical
areas, as permitted by statute. One boundary of the two districts was an adjoining one. The promoter of a real estate development, located physically within one district, could effect
substantial savings in his costs respecting water mains and
connecting lines by arranging for water services to be provided
by the adjoining district, and water connections for his promotional houses were made accordingly. The other district
applied to the courts for an injunction to prohibit the business
arrangement made by the real estate promoter with the rival
water district. The pertinent portion of the basic state statute
authorizing activities and functions of water districts simply
provided: "Water districts may supply water services to persons outside of the district." The problem of course was
whether this statutory language permitted a water district in
effect to invade or raid another district for customers. Stated'
another way (using words or language symbols differently in
a less dramatic perhaps not so slanted more objective manner),
the question was whether the statute simply authorized water
services to be supplied by a district to persons outside the district but not residing in another district. The official journals
of proceedings in the House and the Senate of the State Legis15. Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, 62 Wash.2d 319, 382 P.2d 6M9
(1963).
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lature provided no help; i.e., no clues were available as to the
meaning of the pertinent statutory language. There were no
committee reports available or other material indicative of
either legislative intent or the meaning of the language of the
statute. In the face of little or no help in terms of legislative
documents or other published material relative to the meaning
of the statute, and practically with no other pertinent information or facts, our court nevertheless had to make a decision
and determine the outcome of the case. This, of course, the
necessity that a decision be made, is one of the special characteristics of the judicial function, perhaps the vital one. It
was my assignment to write the opinion for the court, deciding
this legal controversy. The decision restricted water districts
to customers within their own district and to persons outside of
the district, but not residing in any other water districts. Obviously, one of the considerations in resolving this case was to
prevent one district from jeopardizing the operations and the
orderly development of the facilities of another district.
Where does this case fit, in terms of our evaluative, juristic
spectrum? What were the determining factors involved in the
appellate process? Was it enough that the appellate court of
necessity had to make a decision, simply to settle the controversy?
Several years ago, a case", in our appellate court involved
a state statute which imposed a prison penalty if a convicted
and incarcerated criminal offender escaped "from an institution of the State of Washington." Such a person was in temporary custody in a county jail. He escaped, was rearrested,
indicted, and convicted under the indicated provision of the
escape statute. Custody of state prisoners in county jails had
existed for years and was authorized by certain legislation in
terms of financial reimbursement by the state to the counties
for the cost of services rendered. The crucial question of course
was whether, under the statute and in the particular context,
the county jail was an institution of the State of Washington
and escape therefrom by a convicted state prisoner was punishable under the escape statute enacted by the legislature. Once
again, no legislative records were available to shed any light
as to the nature of the legislative intent or as to how the statute
should be interpreted. We did have the language of the statute,
16. State v. Rinkes, 49 Wash.2d 664, 306 P.2d 205 (1957).
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which obviously did not help. We did have the above-indicated
information about the existing practice (a) that state prisoners
were kept for varying periods of time in county jails, and (b)
that the state paid for these services, but this provided less
than a conclusive answer to the judicial problem involved. Our
court held that the escape of a state prisoner from the county
jail violated the statute. Once again, what were the determining
factors? What considerations of public policy, if any, would
justify the decision in view of the orthodox canon of strict
statutory interpretation respecting criminal statutes? Did the
court construe the statute simply by "looking at its four corners"? Was it simply given a "common sense interpretation"?
Is the latter justification sufficient? Where does this case and
its disposition fall in terms of our spectrum, measure, or standard for analyzing and evaluating the law and judicial disposition of cases?
There are other court decisions I would like to discuss and
bring to your attention for some critical analysis; however, time
is limited and I must move along. But I will take the time to
comment on two decisions in the field of constitutional law.
They do not involve any highly controversial issues respecting
federal versus state constitutional authority and relationships.
And they involve none of the usual supercharged emotional
potential of such matters. But in a milder or more limited way,
serious controversy and some emotional content or overtones
were factors not entirely absent in determining the law and
performing the judge function in these cases involving only
state constitutional issues.
In Hoague v. Port of Seattle,17 a state statute was designed
to permit the development of industrial sites for manufacturing
and other industrial plants. This was to be accomplished by
creating industrial development districts, as provided by the
statute. The statute authorized municipal corporations to create
industrial development districts to acquire real estate through
the exercise of the power of eminent domain; and, subsequently,
to improve, plat and to lease or to sell such real estate for the
establishment and use of industrial plants in the so-called industrial districts. The basic question, a constitutional one, was
whether or not the statute involved the taking of private property for a private or for a public use. The former was pro17. 54 Wash.2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959).
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hibited, the latter was permitted by the state constitution. Our
court, by a five-to-three vote, with one judge disqualifying for
personal reasons, held that the use contemplated by the statute
was a private rather than a public one, and, consequently, was
prohibited by the provisions of the state constitution. A strong
dissent was filed by three members of the court.
Two years later, in Miller v. City of Tacoma,' a somewhat
different state statute was involved. It was designed more
directly for the purpose of urban land renewal and development
rather than for the purpose, as in the Hoague case, of developing industrial sites or industrial districts. In the Miller case
the thesis of the dissent in the Hoague case seemingly became
the law of the State of Washington. The urban renewal legislation involved in the Miller case was upheld by a five-to-four
vote. Interestingly and perhaps somewhat curiously, the Miller
case was argued three times before our court. The first rehearing occurred because of a resignation from the court; subsequently, in a period of several months, another rehearing was
necessary because of the untimely death of one of our judges.
Thus, before the decision could be agreed upon one way or the
other, our court - its qualified and functioning members twice reached an impasse, four favoring and four disfavoring
constitutionality of the statute. Although the court is normally
composed of nine members, a total of eleven judges heard the
case during the three times it was argued before the court. There
is no public record as to how two of these voted. Possibly six
of them could have favored invalidating the statute on the
ground of unconstitutionality. In any event, five of the nine
judges finally functioning on the case voted to validate the
statute. The problem in the Miller case, of course, required the
court to find appropriate or at least persuasive definitions in
the legal literature or elsewhere, or to create ad hoc an appropriate definition of the terms public use and private use. The
constitution obviously used the terms but did not define or spell
out their meaning. The basic problem was, I think, one of approach or method, whether the court should look backward, to
the present, or to the future, or to all three of these dimensions
or factors, in considering the provisions, the purpose and import
of the statute, and applying, construing, or interpreting the
language of the pertinent provisions of the state constitution.
18. 61 Wash.2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963).
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Literally, as mentioned above, the language of the constitution was not self-definitive as to what did or should constitute
a "public use." The problem of the majority as well as the dissent was to brew a judicial recipe which would exude the most
persuasive justification that privately owned real property was
or was not being taken for a public use.
Perhaps it would be repetitive and elaborating the obvious,
and even a bit fatuous, to raise the following questions, but I
will do so: Did the appellate court find or discover the law?
Did the majority opinion of the court operate largely at the
creative end of the spectrum of the law in deciding this case?
Was the operation different, or was it also creative, in formulating and articulating the dissent? What about Cardozo's
formula or generalized definition of the judging function? Does
the formula generally fit the judicial operations in the Hoague
and Miller cases?
The several cases brought to your attention were selected
deliberately from several areas or basic classifications of the
law. They are representative of the judge function in these
several areas: (a) child custody matters, (b) statutory problems and interpretation - civil and criminal, (c) constitutional
problems and interpretation. Admittedly, they fall on our juristic spectrum some distance away from the absolute extreme and
nearer to the opposite pole, or the extreme bearing the labels
flexibility, creativity, and exercise of judicial discretion.
Now, I come to the point where I wish to suggest a review
of what I have said and a regrouping of suggestions or thoughts
I may have been able to present for your consideration.
Why talk about the nature of the law and the nature of the
judging function in terms of careful and realistic analysis and
evaluation, on the basis of some kind of a formula or conceptualistic scale or spectrum with extremes and mid-points, and possibly points in between such? I have done so largely for several
reasons, which I shall now indicate.
First, although you are divided into first, second, and thirdyear law students, you are soon becoming lawyers, and advocates in relation to the problems and the causes of clients. The
breadth and depth of your approach and understanding respecting the many facets of the law and the judging function will
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determine how much assistance you will be to your clients as
an advocate, and will determine whether you meet your responsibilities and how much assistance you will be to the courts.
Perhaps my emphasis upon the absolutes at one extreme, and
creativity at the other end of our evaluative juristic spectrum,
and upon the Cardozo formula, will be helpful. At the risk of
further elaboration of the obvious, I will suggest that most
rules of law are implemented on the basis of the pertinent facts,
or perhaps I could say empirical data, presented and made available for consideration by the courts. More often than not, interpretation or evaluation of these data is likely to be controlling
in terms of decision making in contrast to the positivistic implications or some kind of mystical compulsion supposedly inherent in abstract legal rules and principles. Forthright flexibility and creativity in approach should be a hoped-for characteristic of the young-in-heart law student, because, may I
say, it identifies or predicts professional competence and responsibility and a constructive and successful career in the legal
profession.
As to my second reason for the content of my talk with you,
I turn again to Cardozo where, in The Nature of the Judicial
Process, he says

:19

"The work of deciding cases goes on every day in hundreds of courts throughout the land. Any judge, one might
suppose, would find it easy to describe the process which he
had followed a thousand times and more. Nothing could be
farther from the truth. Let some intelligent layman ask him
to explain: he will not go very far before taking refuge in
the excuse that the language of craftsmen is unintelligible
to those untutored in the crafts. Such an excuse may cover
with a semblance of respectability an otherwise ignominious
retreat. It will hardly serve to still the pricks of curiosity
and conscience. In moments of introspection, when there is
no longer a necessity of putting off with a show of wisdom
the uninitiated interlocutor, the troublesome problem will
recur, and press for a solution. What is it that I do when
I decide a case? To what sources of information do I appeal
for guidance? In what proportions do I permit them to contribute to the result? In what proportions ought they to
19. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9

(1928).
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contribute? If a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to
follow it? If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach the
rule that will make a precedent for the future? If I am
seeking logical consistency, the symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall I seek it? At what point shall the quest
be halted by some discrepant custom, by some consideration
of the social welfare, by my own or the common standards
of justice and morals? Into that strange compound which is
brewed daily in the caldron of the courts, all these ingredients enter in varying proportions. I am not concerned to
inquire whether judges ought to be allowed to brew such a
compound at all. I take judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life. There, before us, is the brew. Not a
judge on the bench but has had a hand in the making. The
elements have not come together by chance. Some principle,
however unavowed and inarticulate and subconscious, has
regulated the infusion. It may not have been the same principle for all judges at any time, nor the same principle for
any judge at all times. But a choice there has been, not a
submission to the decree of Fate; and the considerations and
motives determining the choice, even if often obscure, do
not utterly resist analysis."
Cardozo's observations are applicable today, particularly as
to the understanding of judges relative to their decisional function, and whether they can explain it rationally, intelligibly,
either among themselves or to others. If, as seems to happen
more often than not, a judge is oriented in his thinking too
closely in the direction of absolutes and certainties, his function
is thereby depreciated and limited substantially.
I certainly cannot and would not deny that there are absolutes in the law which prompt the judicial process to operate
and the judge function to be performed, as by an automaton
with relatively mechanical precision. But I feel the emphasis
or modus operandi is substantially in the other direction on our
hypothetical juristic spectrum or measuring stick, indicating
that the process is an on-going, evaluative, and in many respects
a creative one. Related to this there is an important facet worth
mentioning and with some emphasis.
If the law is regarded and over-emphasized in terms of absolutes, and automatic implementation of principles and applica-
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tion of rules, the judge function logically is automatic and absolute in nature. It follows that personal and official responsibility is extremely limited or nil. On the other hand, the Cardozo formula - in the direction of creativity in evaluating the
law and the judicial function - implies or poses significantly
the matter of individual responsibility on the part of the judge.
If judgment, discretion, or choice there is, then it follows there
is responsibility for decision making. I firmly believe that in
our legal system - in terms of the American concept of government under law - a more realistic evaluation of the law and
the judging function is not only desirable, but vital and necessary. Other branches of government in our American system,
formula or ideal of representative democracy are held responsible for decision making. Rationally, logically, it should be
the same insofar as the judicial branch is concerned whether
it be at the state or national level. Some may think it is dangerous, even heretical, to concede that wide areas of judicial discretion or creativity exist, amounting in some instances to the
exercise of almost plenary judicial power. However, a more
realistic conception and evaluation of the judge function, if
coupled with a binding concept of personal and official judicial
responsibility, and public awareness and insistence thereupon,
is much less dangerous than the obverse. In fact, to deny the
existence of broad discretionary power and authority, coupled
with the co-existence of considerable individual responsibility
on the part of the members of the judicial branch, is inimical
to our concepts of government by the consent of the governed;
i.e., responsibility of the governors to the governed for action
and decision making.
Assuming some accuracy for this position, it leads me to a
third reason or basis for my remarks. Not only should we reexamine the nature of the law and the judicial function in terms
of substantive law, but examination, evaluation, and improvement in procedural law, and in the administration of our legal
system, the functioning, day to day, of our courts, should be
high on the agenda of public notice and attention. The objective, an elusive one but reasonably attainable if we persevere,
should be the disposition of lawsuits on the basis of reasonably
acceptable standards of fairness with a minimum of technicality
and delay, and at reasonable expense to the litigants. In the
area of judicial administration, furthermore, I must say that,
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if the law and the judge function are creative to a high degree
in our dynamic democracy, the standards and the methods or
mechanics for the selection, retention, removal, and the voluntary or mandatory retirement of judges certainly become significant to a very high degree. Actually, what are the standards
and the mechanics of our system? What should they be? Among
other things, what standards are uniformly recognized, and are
legally operable respecting education, training, competence, tenure, compensation, removal, and retirement? 20 Does the existing system secure the best talent in the legal profession for the
judicial branch of government?
And now, lastly, there is another and larger frame of reference for my observations and comments. What I am about to
say was characterized by my law clerk as "a leap in the direction of the cosmos." Perhaps it is just this, to think and talk
about world peace and order through rule of law. In any event,
I shall risk the leap. That we are living in the atomic space age
requires little documentation. One atomic-nuclear submarine,
fully armed, packs more destructive force than all of the bombs
dropped by all of the belligerents in World War II. Our physical
facilities of communication and transportation have today resulted in an approximation of Wendell Wilkie's "One World"
concept of several years ago. In the dramatic words of Adlai
Stevenson, "We and other peoples of the world now live side by
side in the same stuffy tenement."
In a half century we have not only experienced two major
world wars of tremendous destructive consequences, but the
forces of destruction in modern warfare have evolved almost
to the point of infinity or totality. Armed conflict and war as
a means for settling international tensions and disputes has
become so staggering and utterly fantastic as to be almost beyond human imagination. A hopeful alternative is world peace
and order through rule of law. I will admit it is a nebulous
hopeful ideal at the present time. But awareness of this possible
peaceful alternative by the legal fraternity throughout the world
is a most hopeful beginning. The considerations I have emphasized herein are, I think, a most important step in such a
beginning. I mean by this the careful analytical investigation
20. KLEIN, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1963) ; VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICLAL ADMINISTRA-

TIoN (1949) ; The Model Judicial Article, 47 J. Am. JD. Soc'y 1-34 (1963).
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and evaluation of law and the judging process, and this in terms
of its assets and liabilities as a potential for the settlement of
international tensions and conflicts.
The American Bar Association is engaged in a hopeful and
encouraging program. Four regional meetings of the world's
lawyers and one world-wide meeting have been held. Perhaps
the discussions have not proceeded in the greatest depth and
breadth; undoubtedly, obstacles and problems and frustrations
have been and will be encountered. But the beginning, to my
way of thinking, is an auspicious and hopeful one. Some "doubting Thomases" will say, among other things, (a) there are no
bases, conceptually or otherwise, for world rule of law, (b) no
legal system can or will operate or work without enforcement
authority, enforcement techniques, machinery, and wherewithal,
and these are now nonexistent, imponderable, and impossible
of attainment at the international level, (c) we know very little
about and doubt if the international court of justice or any other
international entity would be competent and could be trusted.
But may I point out that the same things have been said in a
more localized dimension respecting the courts and AngloAmerican law almost since the time of the Norman Conquest.
There have been frustrations; there have been advances and
regressions. But progress has been made. We, in America, live
today and enjoy the blessings of democracy under a reasonably
successful and on-going system of government under rule of
law.
I would freely admit that transplantation or any effort at
immediate adaptation and application of our Anglo-American
legal system to international problems would be highly unsatisfactory, indeed an impossibility. Neither ours nor any
other legal system in existence today or at any time in history
could adequately cope with the tasks involved. But the point is
this. The elimination of the age-old mystery that shrouds the
law and the judge function, with the resultant realization that
the application of the judicial function varies from the area of
absolute rules to vistas of concomitant creativity and responsibility, will produce a sounder foundation for a larger use of
law experience and legal knowledge. This foundation or understanding, widely known and accepted, could not only vastly improve the effectiveness of our own legal system, but, hopefully,
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further practice and experimentation could produce legal procedures and even a legal system that could be acceptable, understandable, and reasonably operable at international levels. This
is the hopeful and I believe not impossible alternative to war
as the means of settling international tensions and conflicts.
But once again, I stress that the utility of such an ideal is largely
dependent upon a responsible awareness of the judge function
in the rule of law.
Now, in conclusion, the law and the judge function, their
evaluation, their significance in terms of both domestic tranquility and world order, are matters presently in the hands of
those of us oldsters actively engaged in the work of the bar
and the bench and the law schools. But an inevitable finger
points and writes in a moving context. You and your associates
in the law schools around the world hold the key to the future.
Today's challenge is, I believe, in breadth, depth, and total scope,
the greatest for the legal profession of any period in the memory
of man. I hope and I believe in the future, and that it is in good
hands.

